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CONGRESSIONAL OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE A FORUM
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS: DISCRIMINATORY
JURISDICTIONAL RULES AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
Lea Brilmayer* and Stefan Underhill**
In recent sessions of Congress, opponents of an "activist" judici-
ary have attempted to divert from federal courts issues such as
abortion, school busing, and school prayer. The proposals to ex-
clude these constitutional issues from federal courts have stirred
great interest in the theory of federal court jurisdiction1 because
the proposals seem to threaten the continued existence of contro-
versial rights. The prospect of exploring the limits of congressional
power to control federal court jurisdiction is especially attractive
*Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
**Class of 1984, Yale Law School.
1 The literature on the constitutionality of court-stripping bills is so extensive that we list
here only the articles bearing most directly on our thesis. See, e.g., Bator, Congressional
Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 1030 (1981); Eisenberg,
Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 Yale L.J. 498
(1974); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953); Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term,
Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17 (1981); Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zon-
ing Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 129 (1981); Van
Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229 (1973); Young, Con-
gressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein
Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. Rev 1189.
The list of court-stripping bills also seems endless. See, e.g., S. 1742, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981) (to restrict jurisdiction of federal courts to prohibit voluntary prayer in public
schools and public buildings); S. 1005, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to restrict jurisdiction of
federal courts to require forced attendance in public schools on basis of race, creed, color, or
sex); S. 528, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (same); S. 481, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to
restrict jurisdiction of federal courts to prohibit voluntary prayer in public schools and pub-
lic buildings); S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to restrict federal court jurisdiction over
abortion cases). See generally Baucus & Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on
the Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 988, 992-94 (1981).
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because the issue is guided by few judicial precedents and because
jurisdictional questions are peculiarly vulnerable to clever and ma-
nipulative legal logic.
Proponents of the recent proposals contend that article III of the
Constitution allows Congress to strip federal courts of jurisdiction
to hear certain constitutional claims. Article III provides that Con-
gress may both create lower federal courts2 and regulate and create
exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.3 The lan-
guage of article III apparently grants Congress the power to create
lower federal courts that exercise only part of their constitutionally
permissible power4 and most certainly grants it power to limit the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in some as yet unspecified
way.-5
It is not clear whether article III allows Congress to draw juris-
dictional lines that disfavor particular constitutional rights. Be-
cause the language of article III does not explicitly prohibit juris-
dictional statutes of this sort, the arguments supporting the
validity of court-stripping bills are founded on an allegedly
straightforward reading of the constitutional text." The usual argu-
2 Article III, § 1 states in relevant part: "The judicial power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
3 Article III, § 2 states in relevant part: "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
4 The power to create the inferior federal courts, granted in articles I and III of the Con-
stitution, has been held to imply the power to establish the jurisdiction of these courts.
Thus, the Supreme Court stated in Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850), that "hav-
ing a right to prescribe, Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of
any of the enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but
such as the statute confers." Id. at 448.
5 See Hart, supra note 1; Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 157-58 (1960); Sager, supra note 1, at 25.
We do not differentiate in this paper between district court jurisdiction and Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction even though the textual provisions are different. The require-
ment of equal access applies to both, even though Congress is apparently required to estab-
lish some appellate jurisdiction but need not create any lower federal courts. Once Congress
recognizes general federal question jurisdiction, all limits on the district courts may be
treated as exceptions, just as restrictions on the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction are.
See infra text accompanying notes 67-71.
6 Bator, supra note 1, at 1038; Rice, Congress and the Supreme Court's Jurisdiction, 27
Vill. L. Rev. 959, 962-64 (1981); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L.
820
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1983] Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules 821
ments against jurisdictional gerrymandering are based, in contrast,
on reasoned speculation about what "our perfect Constitution"7
ought to say.8 These arguments, however, have seemed too subtle,
too daring, and perhaps too motivated by sympathy for the consti-
tutional rights in question to convince the proponents of the court-
stripping bills that their proposed measures would exceed congres-
sional power.
A more promising argument against jurisdictional gerrymander-
ing is based on a line of authority from a less controversial area,
the conflict of laws. This line of authority shows that in no other
legal context within our federal system has the power to establish
and regulate courts carried with it the power to enact jurisdictional
statutes that discriminate against claims arising from other sources
of law within that system.9 For example, although states have the
power to create state courts and to regulate their jurisdiction, they
may not refuse to adjudicate claims on grounds that the claims
were created by federal law or by the laws of other states.10 Juris-
dictional bills that discriminate without sufficient reason against
causes of action that the legislature did not create are
unconstitutional.11
Our analogy does not require the invalidation of substantial
Rev. 1001, 1005 (1965).
The phrase is from Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981).
8 See, e.g., Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 929, 932
(1981); Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Excep-
tions Clause, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 900, 915 (1981).
' Although the mere power to establish and regulate a court system does not carry with it
the power to discriminate against other sources of law, the Constitution itself could provide
for exceptions to this rule. For example, two different constitutional provisions now permit
jurisdictional rules providing for unequal access to federal courts for suits based on state
law. First, the diversity of citizenship requirement explicitly permits exclusion of state
claims from federal courts that are not between citizens of different states. Second, the 11th
amendment allows states to keep suits from federal courts by waiving sovereign immunity
solely in their own courts. The result of 11th amendment immunity is that states can pre-
empt the federal courts from hearing cases that they would otherwise be competent to hear.
These constitutional grants generally allow Congress to enact jurisdictional statutes discrim-
inating against state law in the federal courts. Federal enforcement of state law is therefore
distinct from federal enforcement of constitutional claims where no similar constitutional
limitations exist.
10 See, e.g., R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law 148 (3d ed. 1977); R. Weintraub, Commen-
tary on the Conflict of Laws 408 n.52, 532-34 (1971).
11 See infra text accompanying notes 28-52.
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numbers of existing jurisdictional statutes."2 We argue only that
Congress cannot discriminate against constitutional claims in
drafting jurisdictional bills. Congress cannot single out constitu-
tional issues and exclude them from federal court jurisdiction
without a sufficient reason, and hostility to the substantive rights
at issue is not a sufficient reason. Moreover, none of the bases that
have been found sufficient in the analogous area of state court ju-
risdiction are pertinent to the federal court-stripping bills. There-
fore, unless Congress possesses a greater power -over federal courts
than state legislatures possess over state courts-which seems un-
likely1 3-the court-stripping bills are unconstitutional.
I. EQUAL ACCESS FOR OTHER SOURCES OF LAW
Congress undeniably enjoys at least some power under article III
to shape both the overall jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts
and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.1 4 Indeed, the
Supreme Court's expansive reading of the exceptions clause, most
notably in Ex Parte McCardle,5 has led to almost consistent judi-
cial approval of statutes limiting federal court authority.,6 This
broad interpretation has inspired several commentators to posit
virtually unlimited congressional control over federal court
jurisdiction.1 7
Their position derives support from the fact that Congress has
pared federal jurisdiction to a fraction of its potential reach" with-
12 See infra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
'3 See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
25 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). In Ex parte McCardle, the Supreme Court stated: "We
are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its
power under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdic-
tion of this court is given by express words." Id. at 514.
1" See infra notes 101-21 and accompanying text.
1 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 1; Rice, supra note 6, at 960, 975-76.
18 Article III, § 2 of the Constitution describes this potential power:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Contro-
versies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or
more States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under the Grants
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.
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out provoking even a hint of constitutional objection. For example,
although the Constitution would allow diversity jurisdiction over
cases in which some plaintiffs were from the same states as some
defendants, Congress has not broadened the jurisdictional statutes
that have been interpreted as requiring complete diversity among
opposing litigants.19 Congress could also vest federal courts with
the power of nationwide service of process, 20 but it has chosen in-
stead to require federal courts to conform, in most instances, to the
jurisdictional reach of the courts of the states in which they sit.21
Amount in controversy requirements are yet another example of
federal court jurisdictional constraints.2 Despite the withdrawal of
jurisdiction that these examples represent,2 3 no one questions their
constitutionality. To any view, these jurisdictional limits seem in-
nocuous. Rules that restrict consideration of such constitutional is-
sues as abortion, however, strike some as outrageous.
The currently proposed court-stripping bills differ most obvi-
ously from the accepted jurisdictional limitations because they
would exclude particular rights or remedies from federal court ju-
risdiction.24 An amount in controversy requirement is not designed
to exclude any particular substantive claim from federal courts,
but rather to exclude all trivial ones. A jurisdictional ban on school
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
29 Diversity jurisdiction is granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). Since Justice Marshall's
opinion in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), the federal courts have
required complete diversity. The only exception to this rule is in federal interpleader cases
under 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (1976), which requires only minimal diversity. See C. Wright,
Handbook on the Law of Federal Courts § 24, at 92-96 (3d ed. 1976).
20 See Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946).
21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
22 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
3 Whenever Congress omits any type of potential jurisdiction from its grant of jurisdic-
tion to the Supreme Court, the Court treats the omission as a withdrawal of the jurisdiction
it would otherwise enjoy. Thus, as Chief Justice Marshall stated in Durousseau v. United
States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810):
When the first legislature of the union proceeded to carry the third article of the
constitution into effect, they must be understood as intending to execute the power
they possessed of making exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme
court. They have not, indeed, made these exceptions in express terms. They have not
declared that the appellate power of the court shall not extend to certain cases; but
they have described affirmatively its jurisdiction, and this affirmative description has
been understood to imply a negative on the exercise of such appellate power as is not
comprehended within it.
24 See, e.g., bills listed supra note 1.
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Virginia Law Review
prayer cases, in contrast, is aimed only at the mandate of church
and state separation. This singling out of disfavored substantive
rights is the focus of most theories attacking jurisdictional
gerrymandering.25
Distinguishing generally accepted jurisdictional limitations from
the selective exclusion of constitutional rights does not, of course,
explain why one type of limitation is acceptable but the other is
not. One can certainly argue that the very point of allowing Con-
gress not to create lower federal courts and to make "exceptions"
to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction is to allow selective with-
drawals of constitutional jurisdiction." Apparently, no constitu-
tional case enjoys an absolute right to be adjudicated in the lower
federal courts because the Constitution would permit Congress to
decline to establish such courts, nor must any particular case
outside the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction nebessarily be
heard in that Court.27 Otherwise, the textual grant of congressional
power in article III would be reduced to a triviality, and statutes
such as amount in controversy provisions might have to be de-
clared invalid. To understand why litigants armed with constitu-
tional claims deserve more constitutional solicitude than, for exam-
ple, proponents of expanded diversity jurisdiction, one need only
turn to the analogous context of state jurisdictional statutes.
A. State Jurisdictional Statutes
State legislatures have similar power to structure state courts as
Congress does to structure federal courts. If anything, state author-
ity is broader because of the constitutional parameters within
which the federal judicial system must be structured.2" Except for
the potential power to allow nationwide service of process, 9 the
federal court system is subject to as many constitutional strictures
as the states.30
15 See, e.g., Sager, supra note 1; Tribe, supra note 1.
26 See Bator, supra note 1, at 1036, 1038; Rice, supra note 6, at 962-64; Wechsler, supra
note 6, at 1005.
27 See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
23 Federal courts, unlike state courts, are courts of limited jurisdiction. An affirmative
constitutional source of jurisdiction must be found before a federal court has jurisdiction
over a cause of action. See supra note 23.
29 See Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946).
30 Indeed, it is subject to more because several provisions of the Bill of Rights apply only
824 [Vol. 69:819
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The Supreme Court has had no difficulty striking down state ju-
risdictional statutes that discriminate against causes of action that
the state did not create; although states have expansive power to
structure a court system as they choose, they must sometimes pro-
vide a forum against their wishes. For example, in most instances,
a state must provide a forum to adjudicate claims based on other
states' law. The Supreme Court has consistently held, under the
full faith and credit clause, that a state must give the same access
to its court system for actions based on another state's law as it
does for similar actions based on its own law. The leading case in
this area is Hughes v. Fetter.3' In Hughes, an accident occurring in
Illinois resulted in the death of a Wisconsin resident. The dece-
dent's administrator brought suit in Wisconsin because the defen-
dant was also a Wisconsin resident, but based the cause of action
on an Illinois wrongful-death statute."2 The trial court dismissed
the complaint because a Wisconsin door-closing statute permitted
suits only for deaths "caused in this state,"' s and the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin subsequently affirmed.34
The United States Supreme Court reversed, citing the full faith
and credit clause and holding that "Wisconsin cannot escape this
constitutional obligation to enforce the rights and duties validly
created under the laws of other states by the simple device of re-
moving jurisdiction from courts otherwise competent."35 The Court
stated that it was "not crucial" that no other forum was available
to hear the cause,38 and any doubt that might have existed on that
score was eliminated the following term in First National Bank of
Chicago v. United Air Lines.3 The crucial factor in Hughes, as the
against the federal government and not against the states. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404 (1972) (state constitutional provision authorizing verdict by 10 of 12 jurors in criminal
cases does not violate right to jury trial under 6th and 14th amendments); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (due process clause of 14th amendment does not guaran-
tee right of jury trial in state juvenile delinquency proceedings).
31 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
2 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 70, §§ 1-2 (Smith-Hurd 1936).
" Wis. Stat. § 331.03 (1949).
Hughes v. Fetter, 257 Wis. 35, 42 N.W.2d 452 (1950).
341 U.S. at 611.
U Id. at 613.
" 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
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00 ID. Ann. Stat. ch. 70, §§ 1-2 (Smith-Hurd 1936).
00 is. t t. . ( ).
.. ughes v. etter, 257 is. 35, 42 . .2d 452 (1950).
II . . t •
.. Id. at 613.
07 . . ( ).
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Court noted still later, "was that the forum laid an uneven hand on
causes of action arising within and without the forum state."36
In Broderick v. Rosner,"9 moreover, the Court held that merely
labeling a statute "remedial" would not save it if it was in truth a
refusal to enforce a sister-state's laws. In Broderick, the New
Jersey courts refused to hear a suit based on a New York statute40
to collect assessments from 557 New Jersey stockholders of a New
York bank. The New Jersey courts dismissed the claim because a
New Jersey statute limited actions against stockholders based on
foreign law to equitable remedies.41 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the state could not "under
the guise of merely affecting the remedy, deny the enforcement of
claims otherwise within the protection of the full faith and credit
clause, when its courts have general jurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter and the parties." 42
States must also provide equal access to their courts for claims
based on federal law if state courts would otherwise have jurisdic-
tion under local jurisdictional rules. An early case recognizing this
principle was Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail-
road,43 in which the courts of Connecticut had refused to adjudi-
cate a claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Empha-
sizing that Connecticut courts had power to adjudicate actions of
this sort under their "ordinary jurisdiction, ' 44 the Supreme Court
reversed. The same result was reached in McKnett v. St. Louis &
San Francisco Railway,4 5 which also emphasized that "the ordi-
nary jurisdiction of the [state] circuit court is appropriate to en-
force the right. . . conferred upon the plaintiff. . . by the Federal
Employers' Liability Act."'46 The Court held that under such cir-
cumstances "the Federal Constitution prohibits state courts of
"8 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 518 (1953).
39 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
40 N.Y. Banking Law § 120 (Consol. 1930) (renumbered § 113-a (Consol. 1971)).
41 Broderick v. Abrams, 113 N.J.L. 305, 174 A. 507 (1933).
42 294 U.S. at 642-43.
43 223 U.S. 1 (1911). See also Claflin v. Housman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876) (competent state
courts must hear claims under federal statutes unless exclusive federal jurisdiction is
provided).
44 223 U.S. at 55-59.
45 292 U.S. 230 (1933).
46 Id. at 233.
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general jurisdiction from refusing to [hear a claim] solely because
the suit is brought under a federal law."' 7
The best known case in this line, however, is probably Testa v.
Katt.48 In Testa, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island had held that
Rhode Island courts could refuse to adjudicate a claim based on
the Federal Emergency Price Control Act. Again, the United
States Supreme Court reasoned that because Rhode Island courts
would have entertained a similar cause of action based on Rhode
Island law, they "have jurisdicton adequate and appropriate under
established local law to adjudicate the [federal] action."4 9 The
Court therefore remanded the case for consideration by the state
courts.
The vitality of Testa was recently underscored in FERC v. Mis-
sissippi.50 Relying strongly on Testa, the Court in FERC required
state utility regulatory commissions to take appropriate rule-mak-
ing action to implement federal policy. The Court pointed out that
"dispute resolution of this kind is the very type of activity custom-
arily engaged in by the Mississippi Public Service Commission. '51
The holding required the state affirmatively to provide a forum for
implementation of federal programs, noting that "certainly Testa
v. Katt... reveals that the Federal Government has some power
to enlist a branch of state government-there the judiciary-to
further federal ends. '52
The requirement that a state provide a forum for federal and
other states' law does not, however, restrict the ability of a state to
structure its court system in ways that do not discriminate against
other sources of law. The Supreme Court long ago recognized that
[it is the right of every State to establish such courts as it sees fit,
and to prescribe their several jurisdictions as to territorial extent,
subject-matter and amount, and the fimality and effect of their de-
cisions; provided it does not encroach upon the proper jurisdiction
of the United States, and does not abridge the privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States, and does not deprive any
person of his rights without due process of law, nor deny to any
47 Id. at 233-34.
48 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
49 Id. at 394.
50 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
51 Id. at 760.
" Id. at 762 (footnote omitted).
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person the equal protection of the laws, including the equal right
to resort to the appropriate courts for redress.53
These holdings do not require a state to establish courts with sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over all types of foreign claims that might
arise. Once state courts are created, however, access for all claims
must be comparable to the access provided for local claims.
Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co."" illustrates a state's right to en-
force neutral rules that disfavor a sister state's law. In Wells, a
Pennsylvania federal district court in a diversity case applied
Pennsylvania's one-year statute of limitations for wrongful-death
actions instead of the two-year limitation included in the Alabama
wrongful-death act under which the suit was brought.55 The Su-
preme Court affirmed by recognizing that such a ruling would al-
low Pennsylvania to apply the same "one-year limitation to all
wrongful-death actions wherever they may arise." 56
A line of cases has similarly recognized under the adequate and
independent state ground doctrine that a state rule of practice or
procedure can serve as an adequate basis for dismissal of a federal
claim. The leading case to uphold such a dismissal is Herb v. Pit-
cairn, in which an FELA action had been dismissed by an Illinois
court for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff in Herb had filed his
federal claim in a city court rather than a circuit court as required
by Illinois statute.5s The Supreme Court on review affirmed that
whether a case was properly pending
is a question to be determined by Illinois law, as interpreted by the
Illinois Supreme Court.... It would not be open for us to say
that the state in setting up a local court could not limit its jurisdic-
tion to actions arising within the city for which it is established.5'
Once state courts are established and defined by state legisla-
tures, then, they must be open for actions arising under laws the
53Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30 (1880).
345 U.S. 514 (1953). Although Wells was a diversity case in federal court, the holding
clearly applies to state adjudication of other states' claims. Id. at 516.
" Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 102 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
345 U.S. at 519.
17 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
" The Supreme Court of Illinois had interpreted the Illinois Constitution to disallow city
court jurisdiction over causes of action that arose outside the city where the court was lo-
cated. See Werner v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 379 IMI. 559, 42 N.E.2d 82 (1942).
51 324 U.S. at 120-21.
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forum did not create to an extent consistent with their general ju-
risdiction. Comparable limits, we believe, apply to Congress in de-
fining federal court jurisdiction over constitutional issues. Thus,
the proposed court-stripping bills are valid only if the principle of
equal access does not apply to constitutional claims-if somehow
by climbing one rung on the federal ladder, the principle becomes
inapplicable.
B. Foundations of the Right of Equal Access
The general issue of legislative discrimination against causes of
action that the legislature did not create is endemic to any effort
to achieve interjurisdictional cooperation and integration. In a
world with a single sovereign lawmaking power, there would be
"vertical integration" of the entire process of norm formulation,
application, and enforcement. A single sovereign 0 would supply
the relevant rules of decision, adjudicate the controversy under its
own rules of jurisdiction and procedure, and carry out the final
judgment. There could be no question of discrimination against ex-
ternal sources of law, and variations in jurisdiction or procedure
among different substantive rules could be explained by alluding
to the sovereign's power to amend or revoke the substantive rules
themselves.
Where law comes from several sovereigns, however, additional
problems arise. In a confederacy or a disconnected group of na-
tions, for example, each source of power might decline to recognize
the substantive decisions of the others. Alternatively, each sover-
eign might agree to enforce the others' law but on terms less
favorable than those it uses in enforcing its own. It was precisely to
avoid such a sorry state of affairs that the Constitution created a
federal system to replace the confederacy.61 The effects of federal-
ism are most obvious on state courts, as the settled doctrine dis-
cussed previously demonstrates. Although the Constitution does
not require states to create any particular type of court system or
1o In using the word "sovereign," we mean "actor in the political system" and do not
intend to raise deep issues of state sovereignty and federalism such as those in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
41 For a more precise analysis of the accuracy of the labels "confederacy" and "federal-
ism," see S. Davis, The Federal Principle (1978).
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Congress to establish a system of lower federal courts,62 it does de-
mand that once such courts are created, they must be open to en-
force causes of action of other equal or superior sovereigns within
our federal system unless some valid reason besides "mere foreign-
ness" can be shown.
The equal access requirement is thus a rule of necessity in
American federalism. Without such a principle, coequal and lesser
sovereigns could completely ignore the laws of their partners and
superiors, and the nation would never have become the effective
union that the framers of the Constitution intended. Furthermore,
to exclude constitutional claims from the principle of equal access
would be to exclude from parity the very source of law upon which
the whole system of federalism rests. As the Supreme Court has
plainly explained in requiring state courts to hear federal claims
consistent with state jurisdiction, the requirement of equal access
rests upon "the common fealty of all courts, both state and na-
tional, to both state and national constitutions, and the duty rest-
ing upon them, when it [is] within the scope of their authority, to
protect and enforce rights lawfully created .... "Is
The equal access principle takes different constitutional forms.
In the case of one state applying another state's law, it is embodied
in the full faith and credit clause. 4 That clause regulates the def-
erence each sovereign state must show toward other states in our
constitutional system. 5 In the case of states applying federal law,
82 We need not argue, as did Professor Eisenberg, that:
The lower federal courts are thus indispensable if the judiciary is to be a co-equal
branch and if the "judicial Power of the United States" is to remain the power to
protect rights guaranteed by the Constitution and its Amendments. Abolition of the
lower federal courts is no longer constitutionally permissible; with the demise of the
assumption that they may be abolished it must necessarily follow that the jurisdiction
of these courts is not a matter solely within the discretion of Congress.
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 533.
63 Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 223 (1915).
" "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
65 As Justice Jackson explained, "By the full faith and credit clause [the Framers] sought
to federalize the separate and independent state legal systems by the overriding principle of
reciprocal recognition of public acts, records and judicial proceedings [and thereby to avoid]
the disintegrating influence of provincialism in jurisprudence . . . ." Jackson, Full Faith
and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1945).
[Vol. 69:819
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however, the supremacy clause provides the constitutional
underpinnings.6
The constitutional provision behind the equal access principle in
federal jurisdiction for constitutional claims is not, of course, full
faith and credit or the supremacy clause. The guiding force is the
supremacy principle announced in Marbury v. Madison.67 The
Marbury principle holds that congressional action is assessed ac-
cording to the Supreme Court's interpretations of the constitu-
tional text. The Constitution as interpreted by the courts bears the
same relation to federal legislation, therefore, as federal legislation
bears to state law. In neither situation does the jurisdiction-regu-
lating body supply or control the applicable substantive law. For
the same reason states may not exclude federal claims from their
courts, Congress may not exclude constitutional claims from fed-
eral courts.6 8
The constitutional gerrymandering problem, however, arguably
differs from the state context in two ways. First, the federal courts
themselves, and not some external source of law, are responsible
for announcing the constitutional rules in question. Reserving
courts for local law, then, does not as aptly describe the motive
behind the court-stripping bills as it would in the state court set-
ting. What motivates the bills is hostility toward both the substan-
tive doctrines at issue and the federal courts for having "injected"
the doctrines into the Constitution in the first place.69 In the eyes
of their proponents, the bills are designed to retaliate against the
courts for "misinterpreting" the Constitution, as opposed to retali-
ating against the Constitution's "true" meaning.
The court-stripping bills cannot legitimately be based on cor-
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389 (1947).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Our interpretation of Marbury, of course, assumes that Marbury gives the Supreme
Court the license to be the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution and not simply the power to
decide cases and controversies before it according to constitutional values. The Supreme
Court endorsed this broader view of Marbury most emphatically in Cooper v. Aaron, 385
U.S. 1, 11-19 (1958). Some scholars, however, have argued that a narrower interpretation of
Marbury is more correct. P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart and Wechs-
ler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 25-31 (2d ed. 1973); Wechsler, supra note
6.
"a See Rice, supra note 6, at 980 ("[T]he Court has implied and defined new constitu-
tional rights in various areas, such as abortion and school prayer. These rights are innova-
tive creations of the Supreme Court itself.").
1983]
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recting the federal courts' original decisions because according to
Marbury a federal court's interpretation of the Constitution dis-
places a contrary congressional interpretation. Congressional dis-
taste for a particular decision, therefore, cannot serve as a legiti-
mate basis for jurisdictional limitations. If jurisdictional legislation
stands or falls on the validity of the original court decision, any
court bound by substantive precedent would have to strike down
conflicting jurisdictional legislation. Surely state legislatures could
not discriminate against a federal court's interpretation of a fed-
eral statute or constitutional principle on grounds that the federal
court was mistaken or had "usurped" power. Even though state
courts are constitutionally obligated to do their utmost to enforce
the Constitution, they could not, for example, refuse to enforce the
abortion decisions because they believe they were not compelled by
the fourteenth amendment. Neither could a state legislature de-
prive its courts of jurisdiction to enforce the decisions any more
than it could withdraw jurisdiction in Testa. By the same token, as
long as Marbury is the law, congressional disagreement with a de-
cision is immaterial to the validity of the court-stripping bills.
A second possible distinction between the state and federal court
contexts is that the full faith and credit and supremacy clauses
protect the interests of other sovereign entities in the federal sys-
tem, and the Constitution is not a separate "sovereign entity."
Substantive constitutional rights, however, are beyond the control
of Congress in just the same way that federal law is beyond control
of the states; and it is not clear why all independent sources of law
within our federal system whose mandates are insulated from the
control of the jurisdiction-determining legislature should not be
protected in the same way as federal legislation or the legislation
of another state. It is not dispositive that the independent source
of rights is a text and not a legislative body because states must
afford equal access to federal constitutional claims. Moreover, if a
source of "sovereignty" must be found before constitutional claims
are entitled to equal access, one need only allude to the sovereignty
of the people of the United States, which predates the sovereignty
of Congress and is the foundation of Marbury itself.
No apparent reason, therefore, exempts Congress from the re-
strictions applicable to state legislatures. The rationale in both
contexts is that if interjurisdictional cooperation is to succeed, sov-
ereigns cannot discriminate against causes of action that they did
832 [Vol. 69:819
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not create. For a discriminatory jurisdictional rule to be accept-
able, there must be some legitimate basis for the difference in
treatment, something more than an inclination to reserve "one's
own courts" for "one's own law" or for one's own version of the
external law.
One sometimes encounters the dictum that "Congress must take
the state courts as it finds them . ,,. o Our thesis is that just as
federal law may take state courts as it finds them, constitutional
rights may take the federal courts as they find them. Congress'
power to establish lower federal courts and to create exceptions to
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction includes great latitude to say
which statutory cases these courts may hear, but the jurisdictional
rules that Congress creates for controversies of its own creation
must extend across the board to constitutional cases. If a jurisdic-
tional rule impacts adversely on substantive rights that the juris-
diction-determining legislature has created, the costs associated
with the rule have presumably been assessed and overridden in
favor of some valid policy.7 1 Where the impact falls on constitu-
tional claims alone, however, a rational policy cannot be as readily
presumed, and a noninvidious justification for the differential
treatment must be shown.
II. IN SEARCH OF A RATIONAL BASIS
The principle of equal access, because it concerns itself with dis-
crimination, is in some respects reminiscent of the equal protection
doctrine. The similarity raises the question of what standard of ju-
dicial scrutiny should be applied in reviewing court-stripping legis-
lation. Several scholars, trying to apply equal protection analysis to
congressional attempts to restrict federal court jurisdiction, have
insisted on strict scrutiny.72 They need not. Because any plausible
explanation of the bills' purpose will be illegitimate, given the pre-
mise of constitutional supremacy underlying Marbury, the bills
will fail even under rational basis scrutiny. As tlie Supreme Court
has recognized,"3 a purpose that is illegitimate under higher-tier
70 Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 190 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
71 Cf. J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 83-84 (1980) (explaining theory of virtual
representation).
72 See Sager, supra note 1, at 79; Tribe, supra note 1, at 145 & n.68.
7' See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1982).
HeinOnline -- 69 Va. L. Rev.  833 1983
i inatory isdictional









' i ti t
i ti al
ill tion
t t r t t tit ti al . i -
il l
i ti t i i , iated
it t ill l
.71 t
. ,
r s , i i i j ti i tion t i tial
tr t t t .
II. I I I
ri i l f l , it r it lf it i -
ri i ti , i i t i i t l tection
tri . i il rit i t ti r
i i l r ti ill li i i i t tri ing
l ti . r l s l rs, tr i t l l r t ti l is t
r ssi l tt ts t r tri t l t j i i ti ,
i i t tri t r tiny.72 t. se l
explanation f t e ills' r se ill ill iti t , i t r -
ise of constitutional supre acy erl i r ry, t ills
ill f il r r ti l i r ti . th rt
,7s t t r r-tier
.0 Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 190 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)•
.. Cf. J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 83-84 (1980) (explaining theory of virtual
representation)•
•• See Sager, supra note I, at 79; Tribe, supra note I, at 145 . .
18 See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1982).
Virginia Law Review
analysis is no less objectionable when cited in a rational basis chal-
lenge. Thus, we can bypass the difficult issue of the proper level of
scrutiny and focus instead on why the rational basis test cannot be
met in the constitutional context.
One could argue that as long as the rational basis test is not sat-
isfied, it makes no difference whether a principle of equal access
exists; equal protection law would similarly require a rational basis
and dictate a similar result. The analogy to state court jurisdiction,
however, is helpful because equal protection speaks to discrimina-
tion against persons, 4 while equal access addresses discrimination
against foreign rules of law. Although one could rephrase discrimi-
nation against foreign law as discrimination against the holder of
the right created by the law, such a rephrasing is unnecessary
when a more fitting tool of analysis is available. The established
body of case law concerning state court jurisdiction has created
standards for evaluating whether a particular justification for dif-
ferent jurisdictional treatment meets the rational basis test. This
body of law helps define the bounds within which Congress must
act in formulating jurisdictional legislation.
Because a federal system involves both local and national actors,
different permutations of who supplies the law and who enforces it
may occur. We first consider state enforcement of other states' law
and list the recognized bases for different treatment of foreign
claims. We then consider state enforcement of federal claims, a
context in which preemption by federal law is the guiding princi-
ple. Preemption is important because the justifications for treating
the law of a coequal sovereign differently may be expanded or con-
tracted when a superior source of law enters the picture.
Federal adjudication of constitutional claims most nearly resem-
bles state enforcement of federal claims. In the face of a valid fed-
eral law, contrary state law is preempted; given a contrary consti-
tutional provision, federal statutes must give way. Yet to properly
understand the effect preemption has in limiting the acceptable
bases of discrimination, one must first identify the legitimate bases
for different jurisdictional treatment when preemption is not an
issue. Although hostility toward the substantive rights created by
another source of law is not a legitimate basis for discriminatory
'4 "[N]or shall any person. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law.... ." U.S. Const. amend. V (emphasis added).
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treatment, the source of law may be relevant for reasons other
than invidious discrimination. Local implications in enforcing a
foreign cause of action may supply a reasonable basis for a differ-
ence in treatment. The following sections analyze these recognized
justifications for discriminating between coequal sovereigns.
A. Conflict of Laws: State vs. State
Hughes v. Fetter did not render invalid all jurisdictional distinc-
tions relating to the source of the cause of action. To the contrary,
it mentioned with apparent approval several common-law door-
closing doctrines.7 5 Although foreignness per se is not a valid basis
for discrimination,"6 the fact that a cause of action owes its exis-
tence to an external source may indicate that the content of the
right is different. This difference in content may give rise to a le-
gitimate variation in treatment, as shown by the public policy ex-
ception acknowledged in Hughes.
The Supreme Court noted in Hughes "that full faith and credit
does not automatically compel a forum state to subordinate its
own statutory policy to a conflicting public act of another state."'7
For a state to rely upon the public policy exception, there must be
more than just a difference in the laws of the two states; the differ-
ence must be so great that application of the foreign rule would
violate important moral convictions of the forum state. In Brad-
ford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper,8 for example, the Supreme
Court precluded reliance on the public policy exception, stating:
[T]here is no adequate basis for the lower court's conclusion that
to deny recovery would be obnoxious to the public policy of New
Hampshire. No decision of the state court has been cited indicating
that recognition of the Vermont statute would be regarded in New
Hampshire as prejudicial to the interests of its citizens .... [T]he
mere fact that the Vermont legislation does not conform to that
of New Hampshire does not establish that it would be obnoxious
to the latter's public policy to give effect to the Vermont stat-
ute .... 79
See Hughes, 341 U.S. at 612-13.
7' See supra notes 31-52 and accompanying text.
341 U.S. at 611.
79 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
79 Id. at 161-62.
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The public policy exception had been similarly unavailable in
Hughes because "[t]he state has no real feeling of antagonism
against wrongful death suits in general." 80
The full faith and credit clause seeks the "maximum enforce-
ment in each state of the obligations or rights created or recog-
nized by the statutes of sister states."81 The public policy excep-
tion to this clause insures that the forum's sovereignty will not be
impaired by "extraterritorial application" 82 of another state's poli-
cies. By limiting the exception to those circumstances in which the
states' policies are in true conflict, the public policy exception in
effect requires the maximum enforcement of other states' laws con-
sistent with the maintenance of the forum's sovereignty.
Another permissible exception recognized in Hughes is the fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine."3 That doctrine allows a court to dis-
miss a cause of action if the forum and the case are not sufficiently
related. Dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is appropriate
when most of the elements of the cause of action occurred outside
the forum state and when none of the parties is a citizen of the
forum state. The criteria to be considered by a court in making a
forum non conveniens determination include access to evidence,
the desirability of trial by jury in the locality of the relevant
events, the domiciles of the parties, and the difficulty of applying
unfamiliar law.84 The forum non conveniens doctrine was inappli-
cable in Hughes primarily because all the parties were from
Wisconsin. 5
In addition to the public policy and forum non conveniens ex-
ceptions, there are four substantive areas in which the Supreme
Court has recognized exceptions to the requirement of providing a
forum for foreign causes of action: divorce, workmen's compensa-
tion, penal, and tax law. Dismissal of cases in the first two ar-
eas-divorce and workmen's compensation law-is somewhat anal-
ogous to dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine.
Unwillingness to apply another states' divorce law stems from rec-
ognizing the home state's strong interest in adjudicating the mari-
60 341 U.S. at 612. Indeed, the two states' statutes were virtually identical.
81 Id.
82 Bradford, 286 U.S. at 158.
83 341 U.S. at 613.
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
85 341 U.S. at 613.
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tal status of its domiciliaries. Divorce proceedings are sensitive to
the social context and are highly fact specific, making the need for
local adjudication paramount.8 Similarly, the courts of the forum
state will generally refuse to enforce another state's workmen's
compensation act if the act provides for enforcement in the home
state through administrative tribunals.8 7 Again, the need for local
adjudication is crucial because the forum may not have the admin-
istrative machinery available to enforce the right.88
The penal and tax law exceptions, although frequently maligned
by commentators," have been justified on numerous grounds.90
Central to most justifications is the use of the forum state's court
system to carry out the official business of the other state. Thus,
the general principle that the cost of carrying out a state's official
business should be borne by the state to which the benefits accrue
appears to underlie the exceptions.
These four exceptions to the full faith and credit clause are all
holdovers from the common law and were originally developed as
policies governing the recognition afforded to laws of another sov-
ereign nation. This emphasizes the fact that these exceptions oper-
ate between coequal sovereigns. In contrast, the adjudication of
constitutional claims by federal courts involves the enforcement of
supreme law in the courts created by a subordinate sovereign. Be-
cause this relationship is analogous to state adjudication of claims
based on federal law, we now examine how this change in context
" See, e.g., Simons v. Simons, 187 F.2d 364, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951).
'7 Note, Enforcement in One Jurisdiction of Right to Compensation Under Workmen's
Compensation Act of Another Jurisdiction, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 744, 748-49 (1953). See also R.
Leflar, American Conflicts Law § 159 (1977).
" The Supreme Court has implicitly approved the workmen's compensation exception.
See, e.g., Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 359 (1914); Galveston, H.
& S.A. Ry. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, 490 (1912); Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Ware, 15 F.2d 171
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 742 (1926). But see, e.g., Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S.
39, 43 (1965) (allowing state to hear foreign worker's compensation claim because of forum
state's policy of permitting compensation).
" See R. Cramton, D. Currie & H. Kay, Conflict of Laws 135-41 (1981); Greenberg, Ex-
trastate Enforcement of Tax Claims and Administrative Tax Determinations Under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, 43 Brooklyn L. Rev. 630 (1977); Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of
Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1932).
" See Leflar, supra note 89, at 201-02 (historical reasons based on intensely local charac-
ter of early legal system; respect for sovereign rights of foreign states; procedural difficul-
ties-e.g., nonavailability of equivalent remedies; local public policy; practical difficul-
ties-e.g., distance, expense, proof of foreign law; United States constitutional guarantee of
right to trial by jury in vicinity of criminal offense).








il l to enforce the right.88
li ned









l . i ti n f
ent f
l i ate .
t i l ti i i l
f r l l , i t i text
II , . ., i . . ).
17 t , t i i i ti i t ti r en's
e sati ct f t er J ris icti , a . . e . , - ( ). ls .
eflar, erican onflicts a § 159 (1977).
II he upre e rt as i li itl r t r 's sation ti n.
, . ., ss l, Ir . . . . r , . . , ( ); l t , .
& S. . Ry. v. allace, 223 .S. 481, 490 (1912); Texas Pipe Line o. v. are, 15 F.2d 171
(8th ir.), cert. denied, 273 . . ( ). t s , . ., ri r . ri I s. ., . .
39, 43 (1965) (allo ing state t hear foreign r er'8 c e sati clai heca se f f r
state's policy of per itting co pensation).
It See . ra ton, . urrie . a , flict f a s - ( ); r r , -
trastate Enforce ent of Tax Clai s and d inistrative Tax eter inations nder the Full
Faith and redit lause, 43 rooklyn L. ev. 630 (1977); Leflar, Extrastate Enforce ent of
Penal and overn ental lai s, 46 arv. . ev. 193 (1932).
10 ee fl r, s r t , t - ( ist ri l r s s s i t s l l l r -
ter of early legal syste ; respect for sovereign rights of foreign states; procedural difficul-
ties-e.g., nonavailability of equivalent re edies; local public policy; practical difficul-
ties-e.g., distance, expense, proof of foreign la ; nited States constitutional guarantee of
right to trial by jury in vicinity of cri inal offense).
Virginia Law Review
affects the recognized exceptions to the equal access principle.
B. State Enforcement of Federal Claims
States may refuse to adjudicate federal claims when the jurisdic-
tional restriction applies neutrally to exclude claims based on state
laws as well."' Discriminatory door-closing statutes are another
matter and, as with state enforcement of sister-state laws, a legiti-
mate justification for a discriminatory jurisdictional statute must
exist. Certain exceptions that were acceptable between coequal
sovereigns, however, no longer apply. The "public policy" excep-
tion, for example, is inapplicable to state enforcement of federal
claims. The supremacy clause precludes states from maintaining
policies inconsistent with federal law. As the Supreme Court has
observed:
The suggestion that the [federal law at issue] is not in harmony
with the policy of the State, and therefore that the courts of the
State are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because
it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When
Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Consti-
tution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the
States, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as
much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated from its
own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts
of the State.92
When a superior source of law enters the picture, then, the public
policy rationale evaporates.
One of the primary rationales behind the forum non conveniens
doctrine-unfamiliarity with the foreign law-is also unavailable
in the state/federal context. States are bound by the supremacy
clause and state courts are presumed to be as expert at interpret-
ing federal law as are the federal courts.93 The Supreme Court has
also discounted the possibility that the differences between state
and federal law would confuse state courts that had to apply
both.9 4 The forum non conveniens doctrine can, of course, still be
91 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
92 Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1911).
93 See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-
94 n.35 (1976).
" Mondou, 223 U.S. at 58-59.
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applied by state courts if the forum is simply not the appropriate
one to adjudicate the claim.95 A dismissal on this ground, however,
would be a neutral classification based on the characteristics of the
parties and their evidence, not on the presence of federal law.
Finally, the four substantive exceptions that are recognized be-
tween states are not applicable to state enforcement of federal law.
Workmen's compensation and divorce law are not significantly
present at the federal level, and federal courts have exclusive juris-
diction over federal tax litigation.96 The only remaining exception,
the penal law, has been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court.97
This rejection is perfectly consistent with the hierarchical relation-
ship of state courts and federal law. The citizens of the forum state
would bear the cost of enforcing the federal penal law even if it
was handled by the federal courts because they are financially re-
sponsible to both sovereigns. The state and its citizens also share
in the benefits of federal law enforcement.
Although states may not avoid enforcement of federal claims by
characterizing them as "penal," states still do not necessarily be-
come involved in enforcement of federal criminal laws. By statute,
exclusive jurisdiction to try federal criminal cases is vested in the
federal district courts.98 Perhaps the only justifiable nonneutral
basis for state refusal to entertain federal claims is that jurisdic-
tion is denied by federal statute. Just as federal substantive policy
preempts any contrary state policies that might otherwise provide
an excuse for door-closing under the public policy exception, fed-
eral jurisdictional rules preempt contrary state ones.99
The entire analysis of door-closing rules when a superior source
of law is involved can thus be reduced to two issues: facial neutral-
" See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1950).
" See M. Garbis & S. Struntz, Tax Procedure and Tax Fraud: Cases and Materials 226
(1982).
97 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
I 28 U.S.C. § 1355 (1976).
" In contrast, the right to localize jurisdiction by asserting exclusive jurisdiction is un-
available to coequal sovereigns. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (state's doc-
trine of sovereign immunity does not protect it from suit in other states); Crider v. Zurich
Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965) (under full, faith, and credit clause, state may enforce remedy of
another state's workman's compensation law in own courts without also adopting special
procedures of foreign statute); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354
(1914) (state may not create transitory cause of action and also destroy right to sue on that
cause of action in any court having jurisdiction).
19831
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ity and preemption. Facially neutral rules are the only type of laws
that are acceptable when a superior source of law is involved. Jus-
tifications based on local public policy are preempted by the supe-
rior source. Jurisdictional preemption allows the superior source to
require different treatment. Thus, the lesser sovereign must adju-
dicate claims based on the superior source of law unless the supe-
rior sovereign retains the exclusive right to adjudicate a certain
type of claim.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS IN FEDERAL COURTS
A. Equal Access and Precedent
Although we argue that application of the equal access principle
to constitutional claims is well grounded in constitutional theory, a
theory must nevertheless comport to some degree with established
law to make itself attractive as legal doctrine. One scholar claims
that an unbroken line of cases has upheld legislation restricting
federal court jurisdiction.100 On examination, however, all the re-
strictions that have been upheld appear to have involved facially
neutral restrictions and not selective withdrawal of constitutional
claims from federal court jurisdiction.
The most successful court-stripping bill was the one involved in
Ex parte McCardle.101 The petitioner in McCardle had appealed
to the Supreme Court based upon a Reconstruction statute author-
izing issuance of the writ of habeas corpus "in all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States."1 0 2
While the appeal was pending, this statute was repealed. °10 That
the repeal disadvantaged statutory claims as well as constitutional
ones is clear from the face of the original provision. The repealed
jurisdictional provision had been enacted only a short time earlier
expressly to implement the Reconstruction Congress' policy to-
wards southern states' recalcitrance.1 0 4 Congress was thus willing
100 Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 254-60. See also Bator, supra note 1, at 1032.
201 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 1.
102 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. A special jurisdictional grant was neces-
sary to create federal court jurisdiction over McCardle's claim because general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction was not established until 1875.
103 Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44.
101 Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 234-36.
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100 Van Alstyne, supra note I, at 254-60. See also Bator, supra note 1, at 1032.
101 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). See generally Van Alstyne, supra note l.
102 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. A special jurisdictional grant was neces-
sary to create federal court jurisdiction over c ardle's clai because general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction as not established until 1875.
103 Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44.
104 Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 234-36.
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to pay the price of facial neutrality, namely frustration of its own
substantive goals. McCardle, therefore, does not support a congres-
sional privilege to discriminate against constitutional rights by
manipulating jurisdiction, even if the effect in McCardle itself was
to deny jurisdiction to a constitutional claim. 105
Other jurisdictional withdrawals approved by the Supreme
Court were also facially neutral. For example, Sheldon v. Sill0 6
upheld a statute eliminating from circuit court jurisdiction suits by
assignees of notes unless the suit would have been proper in the
absence of an assignment. The statute did not discriminate against
constitutional rights but only removed from federal jurisdiction a
certain range of cases involving assignments.10 7 A legislature does
not have to create jurisdiction for all constitutional claims that
arise,10 s and Sill was an instance of Congress exercising that power.
Another well-documented jurisdictional withdrawal was the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act,109 which restricts federal court power to issue
injunctions in labor disputes. Although the legislation relegated to
the state courts certain constitutional objections to the breach of
labor contracts, the Act also disfavored federal statutory rights.
Most notably, the Act deprived the federal courts of power to con-
sider Sherman Act challenges to union organizations. 110 The Act
simply removed a certain remedy-labor injunctions-from federal
court jurisdiction. Thus, it cannot be characterized as an invidious
discrimination against constitutional rights.
The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,111 which only allowed
a price control regulation to be challenged in the Emergency Court
105 It is also possible that McCardle was influenced by congressional control over the writ
of habeas corpus in a situation of arguable emergency shortly after the Civil War. Article I,
§ 9, which allows suspension of the writ by Congress in cases of "Rebellion or Invasion,"
may indicate that Congress possessed some degree of control over the substantive rights in
question in these precise circumstances. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9
In any case, even McCardle's claim could have been heard under an original writ of the
Supreme Court, rather than on appeal. See Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 250-51.
106 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
107 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79.
100 See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
109 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976). The validity of the Act was recognized in Lauf v. E.G.
Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1938).
110 See B. Meltzer, Labor Law 31 (1977).
" Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23. The validity of the Act was
recognized in Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943), and in Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 427-30 (1944).
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of Appeals, was also neutral. Besides not differentiating between
statutory and constitutional challenges, the Act only limited the
challenges to a certain court; it did not deprive anyone of the right
to a constitutional or statutory challenge, but only required that
challenges be brought in the Emergency Court of Appeals. The Act
was as innocuous as an amount in controversy requirement in a
state court.112
United States v. Klein,"' a Reconstruction period case, is the
only example of the Supreme Court invalidating a jurisdictional
restriction enacted under the exceptions clause. 14 Klein involved
the use of an executive pardon to prove loyalty to the Union so
that the holder of the pardon could retrieve property seized during
the Civil War." 5 An executive pardon is a constitutionally recog-
nized and thus coequal external source of substantive rights.11
The Supreme Court had indicated in earlier cases that a pardon
could be used as prima facie evidence of loyalty,1 but Congress,
frustrated with the President's policies, took jurisdiction away
from the federal courts in cases based on presidential pardons., 8
This jurisdictional statute was invalidated by the Supreme Court
in Klein as infringing the constitutional power of both the judici-
ary and the executive." 9 The ambiguities in the opinion and the
possibility of other explanations for the holding'20 make it impossi-
ble to cite Klein as a definitive source for the principle that dis-
criminatory denial of jurisdiction over pardon cases is unconstitu-
112 Other jurisdictional statutes are also facially neutral. See, e.g., Tax Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). Only two statutes appear to differentiate between statutory and con-
stitutional claims. The Three Judge Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1976), favors constitutional
claims and does not, therefore, violate the equal access principle. The Johnson Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1342 (1976), which discriminates against constitutional claims, speaks only to the
question of remedies and not to jurisdiction.
11s 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
.14 See Rice, supra note 6, at 971.
115 See generally Young, supra note 1.
'" U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
11 See United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542-43 (1870).
"' Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 18 Stat. 230. One commentator, however, has argued that
despite the plain language of the Act requiring the Supreme Court to "dismiss the appeals"
of presidential pardon cases, Klein should not be read as a withdrawal of appellate jurisdic-
tion. Young, supra note 1, at 1221. See infra note 121.
' 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147-48.
120 Klein is often cited for the proposition that Congress cannot use jurisdiction as a
means of regulating the merits of a case. See, e.g., P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H.
Wechsler, supra note 68.
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113 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
114 See Rice, supra note 6, at 971.
11. See generally Young, supra note 1.
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tion. Young, supra note 1, at 1221. See infra note 121.
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Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules
tional under the exceptions and regulations clause.12 ' Yet it is
suggestive that the only regulation of jurisdiction to have been in-
validated by the Supreme Court was the only regulation that selec-
tively closed the door for legal rights that Congress did not create.
The Court stated last term in a different, but related, context:
[I]t is clear that when Congress creates a substantive federal right,
it possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which
that right may be adjudicated ....
[But it does not follow] that Congress possesses the same degree
of discretion in assigning traditionally judicial power to [other
tribunals] engaged in the adjudication of rights not created by
Congress....
. . . In such a situation, substantial inroads into functions that
have traditionally been performed by the judiciary cannot be char-
acterized merely as incidental extensions of Congress' power to de-
fime rights that it has created. Rather, such inroads suggest unwar-
ranted encroachments upon the judicial power of the United
States, which our Constitution reserves for Art. I courts. 122
Application of the equal access principle to constitutional claims
would thus not simply leave Supreme Court precedent undis-
turbed: it would actually be supported by that precedent. Had the
Court condoned federal jurisdictional statutes that exclusively dis-
criminated against other sources of law, it would have been diffi-
cult to argue that the equal access principle should be applied to
constitutional claims. But because the Court has yet to validate a
jurisdictional statute that discriminated exclusively against foreign
sources, and has instead overturned the only statute to do so, both
theory and practice require that federal jurisdiction not be excused
221 In a stimulating discussion of Klein, Professor Young argues that the case imposes
restrictions upon waiver of sovereign immunity such that Congress may not waive immunity
in ways that discriminate against, for example, presidential pardons. Young, supra note 1, at
1230-32. His thesis somewhat resembles ours, but he is focusing not on exceptions to federal
court jurisdiction but rather on exceptions to sovereign immunity. Id. Although the Klein
decision is admittedly ambiguous, the statute itself is susceptible to the interpretation that
the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court were to have no jurisdiction over cases where
loyalty was to be established by reliance upon executive pardon. We thus conclude that the
case lends support to our thesis.
"' Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2876-78
(1982) (dealing with allocation of bankruptcy proceedings between article I and article III
courts).
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Virginia Law Review
from the requirements of equal access.
B. The Rational Basis Requirement and Constitutional Claims
Because the cases are compatible with a general right of equal
access for constitutional claims, the only question that remains is
whether there are rational bases for different treatment such that
a differentiation might rest on some neutral ground. As with state
consideration of federal claims, the public policy exception does
not apply in this context. Congress is no more entitled to rely upon
a policy of hostility to constitutional rights than states are to
maintain policies inconsistent with federal statute. Proponents of
the court-stripping bills are prone to respond that hostile motiva-
tion per se does not necessitate invalidation. 2 ' They argue that
there is no invidious foreclosure of constitutional rights because
state courts are still available to adjudicate the rights in ques-
tion.124 This point, however, misses the mark. A rationale for the
differential access to adjudication must be affirmatively advanced
and hostility does not supply one. Moreover, even if state courts
alone could adequately enforce constitutional claims, this simply
suggests that hostility is not in fact the motivating rationale be-
cause court-stripping does not further that end. The question thus
remains: once substantive disagreement is rejected as an explana-
tion for the difference in treatment, what rationale is left?
The rationales that allowed dismissal in the conflict of laws set-
ting, namely forum non conveniens or the penal and tax law excep-
tions, are not available here. Unfamiliarity with the foreign law,
the only nonneutral justification for the forum non conveniens
doctrine, 25 is not a convincing justification in the constitutional
context. Constitutional claims are not analogous to the penal and
tax law exceptions. Interpreting the Constitution is certainly not a
special burden on the federal courts nor do the benefits from inter-
pretation accrue to a separate sovereign.
The only acceptable reason for different treatment when a supe-
rior source of law is involved 2" 6-exclusive jurisdiction by the supe-
rior sovereign-will also not serve as a rational basis in the consti-
123 E.g., Bator, supra note 1, at 1036.
"I E.g., Rice, supra note 6, at 982.
125 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
12I See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules
tutional setting. The Constitution in no way exclusively reserves
constitutional claims for a court system other than the federal
courts. To the contrary, the Constitution specifically provides that
the judicial power of the federal courts potentially includes "all
Cases in Law and Equity arising under this Constitution . ... "127
No commentator has suggested this as a rationale; it is so far-
fetched that probably no one ever will.
Finally, Professor Bator has argued that the rationale for the
court-stripping bills might be the desirability of allowing state
courts to pass on federal constitutional questions. 128 The putative
benefits of state adjudication are that state courts are closer to the
problems at hand and that it is politically healthy to give state
courts the first opportunity to rule on restrictions of their own
power. 29 To the extent this rationale comtemplates different sub-
stantive results than would be reached by federal courts them-
selves, it comes uncomfortably close to justifying the jurisdictional
restrictions on a desire to reverse federal court decisions on the
merits. 30 As mentioned previously, the basis for the court-strip-
ping bills cannot be hostility to the constitutional issues in ques-
tion." " But it is not otherwise clear why vesting exclusive power to
hear these cases in the state courts would be thought desirable.
Although state courts may be as good as federal courts in inter-
preting the Constitution, it is hard to argue that they are better.'2
:27 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. See supra note 18.
"18 Bator, supra note 1, at 1037.
:29 Id.
30 Other commentators who favor the court-stripping bills have similarly premised their
arguments on the assumption that hostility to a judicial interpretation can serve as a justifi-
cation for the bills. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 6, at 980-81.
131 The principle that hostility to judicial interpretation cannot serve as a rational basis
for the court-stripping bills is, of course, contingent upon the assumption that Congress
cannot change the contours of the rights in question under its enforcement power of § 5 of
the 14th amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the article."). For support of this inter-
pretation, see 127 Cong. Rec. E2383-85 (daily ed. May 18, 1981) (testimony of Prof.
Brimayer on Human Life Statute).
132 In fact, several commentators have argued that the federal courts should have "protec-
tive jurisdiction" over federal claims because of institutional competence. See, e.g., Mishkin,
The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 184 (1953). Perhaps
the strongest case for arguing that the state courts have greater institutional competence is
in abortion cases because family law issues are peculiarly a matter of state concern. The
initial abortion decisions, however, deliberately eroded this judicially recognized state
enclave.
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The bills thus appear to lack any rational basis. If the bills were
facially neutral instead of discriminatory, a presumption of validity
would be appropriate because Congress would not disadvantage
statutory claims without a good reason. 133 But the bills are not
facially neutral, and no intelligible rationale has been or probably
can be articulated to justify them. It is hard to argue that federal
court jurisdiction does not extend to controversies of this sort
when federal courts have general federal question jurisdiction.
Our thesis resembles somewhat an argument that many defend-
ers of these bills would probably accept. To some degree at least,
the power to hear statutory claims carries with it the power to hear
constitutional ones because sometimes both claims arise in the
133 It might at first appear that the requirements of the equal access principle provide
proponents of jurisdictional gerrymandering with an obvious method of circumventing its
effect. If facial neutrality and the absence of hostility are the tests, what is to stop oppo-
nents of, say, abortion from creating a federal statutory right to an abortion and then rele-
gating all abortion claims, both statutory and constitutional, to the hostile state courts? The
jurisdictional restriction would undoubtedly affect all claims equally since the object would
be to rid the federal courts of every opportunity to pronounce judgment in an abortion case.
Congress could then make the argument that it was not acting out of hostility, for it had
created a new federal statutory right to an abortion.
Despite this outward show of neutrality, however, if the motive of Congress in enacting
the jurisdictional restriction was to discriminate against the constitutional right to an abor-
tion, the statute would still fail to meet the standards of the equal access principle. The
Supreme Court has recognized in the equal protection context that even facially neutral
statutes must not be motivated by an intent to discriminate. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976). The argument against this principle's applicability to jurisdictional matters is
that the Supreme Court expressly indicated in Ex parte McCardle that it could not consider
the motives of Congress when reviewing the constitutionality of limitations on federal juris-
diction. This judicial posture seems dated. The modern development of the law of discrimi-
nation recognizes the importance of motive in deciding whether legislative action constitutes
discrimination. For this reason, as Justice Douglas noted in his dissent in Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 n.11 (1962), "[tlhere is a serious question whether the McCardle
case could command a majority view today."
Even if the foes of abortion could clear the hurdle of avoiding discriminatory motive, it
seems highly unlikely that they would want to create a federal statutory right to abortion in
order to strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear abortion claims generally. By so doing,
they would create a new right to abortion enforceable in state courts. It is unlikely, given an
explicit federal statutory cause of action, that even hostile state judges could find a justifia-
ble reason to deny relief to plaintiffs seeking enforcement of abortion rights. Denial of fed-
eral court jurisdiction under such a scheme would at best secure only a Pyrrhic victory.
Proponents of the court-stripping bills may also argue that any bill to limit federal court
access for constitutional claims would similarly limit statutory claims for the violation of
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and thus be neutral. Because § 1983
merely "piggybacks" constitutional violations, however, it can hardly be considered a sepa-
rate violation of a statutory rule.
846







t t t l
i rsies rt




133 It might at first appear that the requirements of the equal access principle provide
i ti nal ri g enting t
, t -
t , , ti ti l t t t i t t ti t en l
it tional, il
ti al t ly t ld
t i
t t t t
.
s it t is t r s f tr lit , r, if t ti f r ss i ti
t j ri i ti l t i ti t i i i t t tit tional t
tion, t e stat te l still fail t eet t st r s f t l ss ri i le.
ti n t t l
t t t t t ti t i t t t i i i t . i t n . i , . .
( ). e ar e t i st t is ri i l 's li ility t j ri i ti al tt r i
t t t t l i i t i t rdle t t it l t sider
t ti s f r ss r i i t stit ti lit f li it ti s f r l j ris-
icti . is j icial st re see s t . r l t f t l f is ri i-
ti r ui s t i rt f ti i i i t r l isl ti e ti stit tes
is ri i ti . r t is r s , s J sti l s t i is iss t i li . .
, . . , .ll ( ), [t]here is ri ti t r t le
l j rit i t .
Even if the foes of abortion could clear the hurdle of avoiding discri inatory otive, it
see s i l li el t at t e l a t t create a fe eral stat t r ri t t a rti i
r er t stri fe eral c rts f j ris icti t ear a rti clai s e erall . s i ,
t e l create a e ri t t a rti e f rcea le i st t rts. It is li l , i
explicit federal statutory cause of action, that even hostile state judges could find a justifia-
ble reason to deny relief to plaintiffs seeking enforce ent of abortion rights. enial of fed-
eral court jurisdiction under such a sche e ould at best secure only a yrrhic victory.
Proponents of the court-stripping bills ay also argue that any bill to li it federal court
access for constitutional clai s ould si ilarly li it statutory clai s for the violation of
c stit ti al ri ts er . . . § ( ) a t s e e tral. eca se §
erely "piggybacks" constitutional violations, ho ever, it can hardly be considered a sepa-
rate violation of a statutory rule.
Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules
same case. Even restrained interpretivists agree that Congress can-
not grant jurisdiction over a case but compel courts to ignore the
constitutional claims and thus to exercise jurisdiction in an uncon-
stitutional way." So much is conceded to follow from Klein. 35
Professor Hart therefore argued that as long as Congress depends
upon the courts for enforcement purposes, constitutional guaran-
tees are reasonably secure.3 6
Our argument, while somewhat broader, likewise depends upon
congressional use of federal courts for purposes of enforcing federal
rights generally. We agree that once Congress vests power to en-
force a federal statute it cannot deny jurisdiction to entertain con-
stitutional challenges to that statute that arise in its enforcement.
The difference between Professor Hart's thesis and ours is that his
only bars entertaining a case without considering the constitutional
aspects of that same case. Hart's theory would apparently approve
a jurisdictional statute that granted jurisdiction to hear all cases
involving enforcement of a federal statute except those that raised
constitutional objections. Such a jurisdictional distinction between
statutory and constitutional challenges, however, would violate the
equal access principle. Thus, we argue that once Congress vests the
power to adjudicate cases arising out of enforcement of the rule, it
may not exclude cases raising constitutional challenges to the rule.
For example, if federal courts have jurisdiction to enforce constitu-
tionally approved portions of abortion regulations, they must also
have jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges to the regu-
lations as a whole.
Furthermore, just as power to enforce a statute sweeps in power
to entertain constitutional challenges to that statute, power to en-
force statutes generally sweeps in power to enforce constitutional
provisions generally. If Congress desired, it could build up federal
'M See, e.g., Bator, supra note 1, at 1035.
,35 See Young, supra note 1, at 1221.
,3 Hart, supra note 1. See also Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 529-30 (assuming that on case-
by-case basis, power to enforce statutes includes power to entertain any constitutional chal-
lenges arising out of case).
Professor Hart does not explain why article III is violated any more by exclusion of con-
stitutional issues within a case than by exclusion of constitutional issues arising out of the
same statute in other cases. Certainly the power to regulate appellate jurisdiction would
allow power to give appellate jurisdiction in some issues in the case but not others. This
might well result in the "incorrect" final outcome of certain adjudications because some
improperly resolved issue was not considered on appeal.
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court jurisdiction statute-by-statute,13 7 and then Congress would
only be required to vest the federal courts with power to consider
constitutional challenges to the statutes over which they have ju-
risdiction. Congress, however, has decided to bestow general fed-
eral question jurisdiction upon the federal courts instead of using a
statute-by-statute approach. If Congress wishes to take advantage
of establishing a general federal question jurisdiction for statutes
and federal common law, it must extend that federal question ju-
risdiction to constitutional claims also.
Little doubt has been expressed that the Constitution requires
establishment of a Supreme Court with some sort of appellate ju-
risdiction. Against a background of appellate jurisdiction extending
to federal questions, congressional action defines which cases may
be excepted. Similarly, a statutory grant of general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction to the lower federal courts defines the backdrop
against which the court-stripping bills create exceptions. Were it
not for these general grants, it would arguably be permissible for
Congress to create a purely statutory jurisdiction by affirmatively
building it up, statute-by-statute, without discriminating against
any constitutional claims at any step. Once there is a general grant,
however, exceptions must be recognized for what they are:
exceptions.
CONCLUSION
The requirement of equal access is appropriately permissive. Ex-
isting federal jurisdictional statutes escape objection because they
are facially neutral-only door-closing rules that single out consti-
tutional claims without valid reason are prohibited. We do not ar-
gue that some core of cases must be heard by article III tribunals.
If an absolute right to federal adjudication exists, its foundations
lie elsewhere than in these pages.
The most serious defect in the usual criticisms against congres-
sional gerrymandering of disfavored constitutional rights is that
they reduce the congressional role to triviality and thus interpret
the regulations and exceptions clause and the power to create
lower federal courts into absurdity. So extreme a stand is entirely
unnecessary when equal access is kept in mind. No one can seri-
"' Indeed, this was the situation that existed until 1875. See supra note 102.
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ously argue that this principle has reduced state legislative control
over state court jurisdiction to a triviality. Certainly it has not
been necessary to grant state courts the power to exclude federal
or sister-state causes of action to preserve some intelligible mean-
ing for their jurisdiction-regulating activities. The normal decision-
making functions of state regulation of its adjudication have pro-
ceeded unimpeded. The congressional regulations of jurisdiction
that have been challenged and upheld or deemed beyond reproach
correspond to this run-of-the-mill state use of domestic regulatory
power.
The congressional power to allocate jurisdiction need not be
broader to give the constitutional text a meaningful interpretation.
Congress need not establish lower federal courts, vest them with
general jurisdiction, or leave the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to-
tally intact. Yet to the extent Congress does leave federal question
jurisdiction intact, it may not deny constitutional claims equal ac-
cess to federal courts. The obligation to cooperate and coordinate
with other coequal or superior sources of law, whether stemming
from full faith and credit, the supremacy clause, or the Marbury
principle, is as much a part of "Our Federalism" as any other
"comity" doctrine regulating the respect of one sovereign law-mak-
ing source for another. 8'
138 Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (federalism requires that federal
courts enjoin state court proceedings only in very special cases). See generally Monaghan,
The Burger Court and "Our Federalism," 43 (No. 3) Law & Contemp. Probs. 39 (1980).
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